Posted: June 11, 2013
In action involving a constitutional challenge to the California
Raisin Marketing Order under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937(AMAA),
7 U.S.C. §§ 701-714, §§ 671-674 Horne v.
United States Dep’t of Agric., No. 12-123, 2013 WL 2459521, -- S. Ct. –
(June 10, 2013), the United States Supreme Court held in Horne v. United States Dep’t of Agric., No. 12-123, 2013 WL
2459521, -- S. Ct. – (June 10, 2013) that the AMAA withdrew Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction arising under the Tucker Act. The
Court further held that the petitioners’ takings claim could be raised as an
affirmative defense against the USDA’s enforcement proceeding against
them. In so holding, the Court reversed
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remanded the matter to the Ninth
Circuit for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
In 2004, USDA brought an enforcement action against Marvin and Laura Horne, et al., (hereinafter petitioners) that alleged that the petitioners were “handlers” under the raisin marketing order and that they had failed to comply with several requirements under the order. The petitioners asserted, inter alia, that they were not “handlers” and, therefore, excluded from coverage of the marketing order. In addition, the petitioners argued that the marketing order violated the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as a taking without just compensation.
In 2006, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held that
petitioners were “handlers” under the AMAA and that they had, as alleged
by USDA, violated several marketing
order requirements. The ALJ rejected the
petitioners’ takings claim as well. On
appeal, a Judicial Officer affirmed the decision that the petitioners were
handlers, but declined to render a decision on the petitioners’ takings
claim. The matter was appealed to federal
district court where it was held that the petitioners were handlers and that
the marketing order did not constitute a takings.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal
district court ruling that the petitioners were handlers. The Ninth Circuit further held that when a
handler raises a takings claim against marketing orders promulgated under the
AMAA, the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction under the Tucker Act is removed by
the AMAA. Interestingly, however, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the petitioners were “producers” – instead of
handlers – for purposes of their takings claim and, therefore, there was nothing in
AMAA that prohibited the petitioners from raising their takings claim in the
Court of Federal Claims. And, on that
basis, the Ninth Circuit held that the petitioners’ takings claim was not ripe
for adjudication.
In reaching its decision, the Supreme
Court stated the following:
Under the AMAA's comprehensive remedial scheme, handlers may challenge the content, applicability, and enforcement of marketing orders. Pursuant to §§ 608c(15)(A)-(B), a handler may file with the Secretary a direct challenge to a marketing order and its applicability to him. We have held that “any handler” subject to a marketing order must raise any challenges to the order, including constitutional challenges, in administrative proceedings. See United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 294, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed. 290 (1946). Once the Secretary issues a ruling, the federal district court where the “handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business” is “vested with jurisdiction ... to review [the] ruling.” § 608c(15)(B). These statutory provisions afford handlers a ready avenue to bring takings claim against the USDA. We thus conclude that the AMAA withdraws Tucker Act jurisdiction over petitioners' takings claim. Petitioners (as handlers) have no alternative remedy, and their takings claim was not “premature” when presented to the Ninth Circuit.The Court further held that “[a]lthough petitioners' claim was not 'premature' for Tucker Act purposes, the question remains whether a takings-based defense may be raised by a handler in the context of an enforcement proceeding initiated by the USDA under § 608c(14). We hold that it may.”
